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WILL THE GENTLEMEN PLEASE YIELD?
A DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATE-IMPOSED TERM LIMITATIONS
Neil Gorsuch*
and
Michael Guzman**

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the 1990 congressional elections, the crescendo of voter
dissatisfaction with incumbent legislators seemed likely to culminate
in substantial victories for challengers across the country. When the
votes were counted, however, only one incumbent senator had been
defeated and ninety-six percent of the representatives who ran were
re-elected.' Such is the story of contemporary American politics: year
after year we witness pre-election expressions of voter outrage that
are followed by consistent re-election rates of ninety percent or
more. 2 Lee Iacocca has summed up the trend with this observation:
"Sitting Congressmen are almost as likely to be sentenced to jail as
they are to be sent home by the voters. Since 1988, six Congressmen
went home and five were sentenced to the slammer."3

* A.B. Columbia University, 1988; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1991.

B.A. Brigham Young University, 1988; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1991. The authors
would like to thank the Honorable David B. Sentelle and the Honorable Douglas H. Ginsburg
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Peter Stone, Steven Ellis,
and David Jones for their helpful suggestions. All errors are, of course, our own.
1. See Mark Blitz, Give Congress Horse Races, Not Distracted Lame Ducks; Term
Limits: The Problem Is Too Little Competition, Not Too Much Longevity, L.A. TIMS, Dec.
14, 1990, at B7.
2. See Mark Tushnet et al., Judicial Review and Congressional Tenure: An Observation, 66 TEX. L. REV. 967, 973 (1988) (observing that, since World War H, voters have reelected over ninety percent of all incumbent representatives running for office); see also
graph at Appendix (from TRUDY PEARCE, TERM LIMTATION: THE RETURN TO A CITmZEN
**

LEGISLATURE (1991)).

3. Lee Iacocca, We Can't Even Throw The Rascals Out; Congress: What Does it Mean
When Incumbents Keep Getting Reelected? That We're Pleased With Their Work?, L.A.
TIMES, May 18, 1990, at B7. Senator Hank Brown (R-CO) has also noted that the turnover
in the United States House of Representatives during the 1980s was almost identical to that
of Britain's House of Lords. The members of the House of Lords, of course, are appointed
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In protest over these re-election trends, a populist movement to
limit the tenure of elected officials has sprung up in the western
states and appears to be spreading rapidly across the country.4 In
1990, California and Oklahoma voters passed initiatives limiting the
terms of their state legislators. 5 Coloradans went further, limiting the
terms of both state and congressional representatives. 6 Despite
Washington's 1991 rejection of a term limit initiative,7 the movement
is unlikely to wane; nearly 150 term limit bills are currently pending
in 45 states, and proponents claim that term limit initiatives will be
on the ballot in seventeen states this November.'
A broad coalition stands behind the term limitation movement.
Consumer activist Ralph Nader, presidential candidate Jerry Brown,
Senators Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) and Dennis Deconcini (D-AZ),
Texas Governor Ann Richards, and other grass-roots liberals have
forged an unlikely alliance with the likes of President George Bush,9
for life. See 137 CONG. REC. S6273 (daily ed. May 22, 1991) (statement of Sen. Brown).
4. Of course, western voters also continue to re-elect their own congressmen. Noticing
this oddity, Jeff Greenfield quipped, "[i]t's almost as if the voters are saying, "Is]top me
before I reelect again.'" Nightline: Congressional Term Limits (ABC television broadcast,
Nov. 4, 1991) (transcript on file with the authors) [hereinafter Nightline]. Certainly, it appears
as though the voters are more dissatisfied with incumbents from other states or districts than
with their own. See, e.g., Timothy Egau, Term Limits; State of Washington Rejects a Plan to
Curb Incumbents, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at B16.
5. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (amended 1990); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 17A
(amended 1990).
6, See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9(1) (amended 1990).
7. The Washington term limit initiative was rejected on November 5, 1991, by a vote
of 54% to 46%. See Ross Anderson, Voters Say, "Not So Fast" Abortion Measure Teeters
On Absentees, SEATTLE TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1991, at Al. Many commentators speculate that the
initiative lost because Washington voters feared losing the influence of Speaker Foley. See,
e.g., Jim Simon, Stunning Loss For Term Limits, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 6, 1991, at Dl.
8. Gloria Borger, Can Term Limits Do the Job?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 11,
1991, at 34. Recently, political commentators have begun to suggest that the 1992 elections
may result in as many as one hundred new members of the Congress. See, e.g., William J.
Eaton, Is Congress Headed For Big Turnover?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1992 at A5. Arguably,
such a large turnover could snatch the impetus from the term limitation movement. It would
be a mistake, however, to attribute all of the predicted change, if it even happens, to antiincumbent sentiment. At most, only about half of the predicted new faces will have beaten
an incumbent. According to one commentator's worst case (for incumbents) projections, sixtyfive representatives will retire in 1992 and forty-two will lose their seats to challengers. See
Charles F. Cooper, Numbers Game: How Many Will Lose Their Seats?, ROLL CALL, Mar. 30,
1992. House members who retire before 1993 can pocket unused campaign funds. This
.severance pay" could be as large as one million dollars for some. Id Of the forty-two
defeated incumbents, a small number can be attributed to redistricting. In 1992, at least five
pairs of incumbents will be running against each other. Eaton, supra. The result of this worst
case scenario: a re-election rate of 88.7%, about the same as that of 1982 (90.1%). Cooper,
supra.
9. A bellicose President Bush lashed out: "Those old guys that control those subcom-"
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Senator Hank Brown (R-CO), and columnists George Will and
Gordon Crovitz. 10 Even Dan Quayle, a Washington establishment
member since 1976, claims to have supported term limits before they
were fashionable.' It seems only long-term legislators, lobbyists, and
academicians oppose term limits with any vigor."
With popular support for congressional term limits running at
almost seventy-five percent and term limit proposals pending in nearly
every state, 3 opponents of such measures have already begun looking to the courts for help. Campaigning against the Washington initiative that would have cost him the job that he has held for twentyeight years, Speaker of the House Tom Foley (D-WA) threatened,
"[i]f the voters of the state of Washington pass this initiative, it
should and must be tested constitutionally, and I will take an active
part in testing it."' 4 Less visibly, Representative Larry Smith (D-FL)
actually became the first member of Congress to challenge the constitutionality of term limits; Smith recently filed a brief that he had
prepared by House Counsel asking the Florida Supreme Court to
issue an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of a Florida term
limit initiative.' 5

mittees haven't had a new idea in the 30 years they've been there, and it's time to change
it, and I mean it. Why do you think the American people are so excited about term limitations? They wised up, they understand it, and I'm going to fight for that, too, all next year.Nightline, supra note 4 (replaying a Bush statement made on October 10, 1991).
10. See Cleta D. Mitchell, Reflections on Congressional Term Limits, 7 J.L. & POL
733, 740 (1991); Susan B. Glasser, Know Your Enemy; Meet the Leading Lights of the TermLimit Movement, ROLL CALL, Sept. 23, 1991, at 21.
11. Quayle insists that he floated the idea as a freshman representative from Indiana in
a 1977 speech. See Glasser, supra note 10.
12. See generally MARK P. PETRACCA, WHY POLMcAL SCIENTISTS OPPOSE TERM
LIMITS (Cato Institute Briefing Paper No. 14) (arguing that political scientists were instrumental in promoting the professionalization of legislators and that they, therefore, perceive attacks
on professional politicians as a threat to their own self-proclaimed professionalism).
13. See Borger, supra note 8.
14. Nightline, supra note 4.
15. See Susan B. Glasser, Are Term Limits Constitutional?: First Ruling by Court
Imminent, ROLL CALL, Oct. 24, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter Glasser, Are Term Limits Constitutional?]. The Florida Supreme Court is faced only with the narrow question of whether a Florida
term limit initiative was properly drafted to include only one issue. Smith's use of House
Counsel to prepare the brief drew criticism. See i. Representative Chris Cox (R-CA) moved
that the House publicly "express regret" at this improper use of House Counsel services. The
motion was ultimately tabled by a 264 to 160 vote. Phil Handy, leader of Florida's "Eight is
Enough" term limit movement, sent a letter to Representative Smith demanding that he
reimburse the House for the approximately $25,000 that it cost to produce the brief. See
Susan B. Glasser, Fla. Court Rejects Brief of House Counsel, OKs Term-Limit Initiativefor
Nov. 3 Ballot, ROLL CALL, Jan. 6, 1992, at 3.
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Opponents contend that a state-imposed limit on congressional
terms is unquestionably unconstitutional. They argue, among other
things, that a term limit impermissibly augments the three qualifications listed in Article I-age, residence, and citizenship-by requiring
that a congressman also not be a long-term incumbent. According to
Representative Smith's brief, "[s]ingularly unanimous rulings of the
Supreme Court of the United States, the Florida courts, and all other
state and federal courts that have confronted such an issue, have
uniformly held that neither Congress nor any of the states may add
to, subtract from, or otherwise modify the three constitutionally enumerated qualifications." 6 Speaker Foley puts the proposition more
bluntly: "Any constitutional lawyer worth his salt will tell you [term
limits are] a sham."17
We beg to differ. Though building a constitutional case for stateimposed term limits is not simple, neither is it as futile as Speaker
Foley and others suggest. The Constitution contains no explicit guarantee of a right to candidacy, ballot-access, or continuity in office.
Indeed, it is precisely because of the Constitution's silence on such
matters that term limit opponents must scrabble to grasp onto little
known handholds like the qualifications clauses to protect their incumbency.
Before taking up the constitutional case for term limits, let us
begin by explaining exactly what we aim to defend. Although various
term limits have been suggested, 8 we will defend a measure similar
to the initiative passed in Colorado-the only congressional term limit
actually passed to date. Colorado's amendment limits United States
Senators and Representatives to twelve years in office, allowing them
to run again only after a four-year "rotation" out of office." The

16. See Glasser, Are Term Limits Constitutional?, supra note 15.
17. Term Limits: The Talk of the Town, THE HOTLINE, Oct. 21, 1991.
18. From a legal standpoint, the least risky way to enact a congressional term limit is
to amend the federal Constitution. In fact, during the 102d Congress at least three such
proposals were made. See H.R.J. Res. 363, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991); H.RJ. Res. 112,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.RJ. Res. 28, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Not surprisingly,
none of these proposals was ever voted upon on the floor. Also, Senator Brown (R-CO)
introduced an innovative term limit proposal in the Senate last year that would link receipt of
federal campaign funds with a pledge by the recipient candidate that he will step down after
twelve years. 137 Cong. Rec. S6273 (daily ed. May 22, 1991).
19. Art. XVIII, section 9(1) of the Colorado Constitution, as amended in 1990, reads in
pertinent part:
[N]o United States Senator from Colorado shall serve more than two consecutive
terms in the United States Senate, and no United States Representative from Colorado shall serve more than six consecutive terms in the United States House of
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Colorado Amendment applies prospectively only; in other words, it
affects only those congressmen whose terms began after January 1,
1991.20 To the Colorado initiative we would add one important provision: an incumbent would be allowed to conduct write-in candidacies at any time. Thus, the term limit that we defend would remove
an incumbent from the printed ballot after twelve consecutive years,
but leave him the option to run as a write-in candidate. The legal
significance of this modification will become apparent later in our
analysis."
Organizationally, we divide our argument into four sections. We
begin in Section I by examining the relevant constitutional history. In
Section II, we consider constitutional provisions and precedents, seeking to determine whether a term limit on the Congress must inevitably be judged an impermissible qualification. Although by no means
an easy argument, this section concludes that a term limit should be
considered a legitimate exercise of state authority to regulate the time,
place, and manner of congressional elections. On that assumption, we
proceed in Section I to analyze whether such a regulation would
violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of candidates or
voters. After demonstrating that a term limit would almost certainly
pass muster on these grounds, this Article concludes in Section IV by
arguing that a term limit imposed only upon state elected officials is
likewise constitutional.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Opponents of term limits frequently emphasize the absence of a
limit on congressional terms in the Constitution as evidence that the
Framers intended to preclude such a measure.' This argument overextends the available evidence. Instead, the recorded history demonstrates that the Framers were indisputably fearful of creating an aristo-

Representatives ....
Terms are considered consecutive unless they are at least
four years apart.
20. COLO. CONST. art. XVII, § 9(1). "This limitation on the number of terms shall
apply to terms of office beginning on or after January 1, 1991." Id.
21. See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text. In practical terms, allowing a writein candidacy hardly saps a term limit of its efficacy, but it does provide some hope for a
twelve-year incumbent who believes he has a mandate. As of 1982, four write-in candidates
had won congressional seats. See Facts on File World News Digest (available in Lexis) Nov.
5, 1982.
22. See, e.g., Steven Greenberger, Democracy and Congressional Tenure, 41 DEPAUL L.
REV. 37, 38 (1991).
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cratic legislature permanently ensconced in the capital. To prevent
this, the Framers wrote relatively short terms of officeholding into the
Constitution on the assumption that frequent elections would ensure a
high degree of turnover. In addition, the Framers gave the states primary authority to regulate the times, places, and manner of congressional elections, a power that the Framers understood would let the
states play an important role in selecting the Congress. With these
safeguards in place, the best explanation for the absence of a term
limit in the Constitution is that the Framers simply thought it unnecessary to include one.
The notion of limiting the terms of elected representatives dates
back at least to the eighteenth century. Prior to the drafting and ratification of our present Constitution, several states limited the terms of
their legislators. For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776
prohibited state legislators from serving more than four one-year
terms within a period of seven years, hoping that "the danger of
establishing an inconvenient aristocracy [would] be effectually prevented."23
Likewise, in our nation's first federal term limit,24 delegates under the Articles of Confederation were limited to a maximum of three
one-year terms during any six-year period.2 In 1784, when this limit was first to take effect, an attempt to exclude delegates who had
exceeded their terms created an ugly incident on the floor of the
Congress. With respect to the bickering, James Monroe commented,
26
"I never saw more indecent conduct in any assembly before."
Perhaps hoping to continue a tradition of limited terms, on May
29, 1787, Edmund Randolph proposed, as part of what has come to
be known as the Virginia Plan, a rotation scheme that would have
27
prevented members of the House from serving consecutive terms.

23.

PA. CONST. of 1776, Ch. II, § 8; see also VA. CONST. of 1776, para. 4 (creating a

rotation system for the senate).
24. The second federal term limit was the enactment of the Twenty-Second Amendment
in 1951, which limits presidential tenure to two four-year terms. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XXII.
25.

ARTCLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V, cl.2.

EDMUND C. BuRNET, THE CONTriNaTAL CONGRESS 606 (1941).
In relevant part, the Plan provided:
Resolved, that the national legislature ought to consist of two branches.
Resolved, that the members of the first branch of the national legislature ought
for the term of
be elected by the people of the several states every to be of the age of
years at least; to receive liberal stipends, by
-[;]
which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public ser-

26.
27.
3.
4.
to
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Randolph's rotation proposal was never the subject of recorded debate
and was set aside two days later along with several other provisions
concerning the legislative branch because they entered "too much into
detail for general propositions."2 8 At that early date in the Convention, the delegates had hardly become comfortable with their decision
to create a new government and they were still debating the larger
issues of its organization. When the delegates did take up the details
of constituting the legislative branch in mid-August, they were no
longer working from the text of Randolph's proposals.29 Thus, the
final version of Article I did not include a system of rotation.30
Each of the early rotation schemes was one of a variety of
mechanisms designed to prevent the national legislature from becoming an American House of Lords; the newly independent Americans
believed that representatives ought to be representative. With his
characteristic forthrightness, John Adams summed up the feeling of
many anti-federalists: "[The legislature] should be in miniature an
exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and
act like them., 31 Of course, not all of the Framers shared the intensity of Adams' view. But even Federalist Alexander Hamilton, never

vice; to be ineligible to any office established by a particular
authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging
the first branch, during the term of service, and for the space
expiration; to be incapable of reelection for the space of -

state, or under the
to the functions of
of
after its
after the expiration

of their term of service, and to be subject to recall. 5 THE DEBATES ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 127 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].

28. Id at 137.
29. On August 6, the Committee of Detail presented each delegate with a printed copy
of the Constitution as it then stood. Id at 376-78. The delegates then proceeded to debate
the various provisions using this version as their guide. This draft did not include Randolph's
rotation scheme. Id
30. See U.S. CONST. art. I. The Framers did debate the idea of a rotation scheme for
the office of President. Before the Convention settled on the present method of electing the
President via an electoral college, the Delegates debated how a President chosen by the state
legislatures could remain independent of them, yet retain some representativeness or popular
accountability. At this point, Charles Pinckney moved that no President could serve more than
six years in any twelve. See 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 365. This motion was
defeated by a 6-5 vote. Id at 368. The representativeness concerns were apparently allayed
by the adoption of a Presidential term of four years instead of the substantially longer
tenures-ranging from fifteen years to life-that were originally proposed. Id at 358-68.
31.

GORDON S. WOOD, I-E CREATION OF TmE AMERICAN REPUBLIc, 1776-1787, 165

(1969). George Mason similarly argued, "[Representatives] ought to mix with the people,
think as they think, feel as they feel-ought to be perfectly amenable to them, and thoroughly acquainted with their interest and condition." CECI
M. KENYON, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS
lii (1966).
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keen on too much democracy, recognized that members of the House
of Representatives "should have an immediate dependence on, and an
intimate sympathy with, the people."3 2
The notion that a long term in office would diminish
representativeness and unduly empower officeholders clearly worried
many delegates. Charles Pinckney, for example, proposed a Senate
term of four years, urging that "[a] longer time would fix them at the
seat of government. They would acquire an interest there, perhaps
transfer their property, and lose sight of the states they represent."3 3
Opposing a proposed nine-year Senate term, Roger Sherman argued:
"Government is instituted for those who live under it ....

The more

permanency it has, the worse, if it be a bad government. Frequent
"
elections are necessary to preserve the good behavior of rulers. 34
John Adams was equally eloquent in his advocacy of frequent elections:
[E]lections, especially of representatives and counselors, should be
annual, there not being in the whole circle of the sciences a maxim
more infallible than this, "where annual elections end, there slavery
begins." These great men ... should be elected once a year-like
bubbles on the35 sea of matter borne, they rise, they break, and to
that sea return.

As a result of these concerns, the Framers adopted relatively
short terms for all federal elected officials. The delegates finally settled on a six-year Senate term only after debating proposals for a
tenure of "during good behavior," nine years, seven years, and four
years.36 Likewise, terms in the House were fixed at two years after
consideration of proposals of three years and one year.37 The presi-

32. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 350 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul L. Ford ed., 1898).
33. Id. at 241.
34. Id. at 243.
35. JOHN ADAMS, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 134 (George Peek, Jr. ed.,
1985).
36. See 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 241-45.
37. Id. at 224-26. The terms of state legislators were mostly fixed at one year. Connecticut and Rhode Island had semi-annual elections and South Carolina held them biennially. See
TE FEDERALIST No. 53, supra note 32, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton). It seems that the
primary reason for choosing two- instead of one-year terms was inconvenience-not for the
electorate, but for the representatives. James Madison, for example, fretted, "[Representatives]
would have to travel seven or eight hundred miles from the distant parts of the Union; and
would probably not be allowed even a reimbursement of their expenses." 5 ELInOTs DEBATES, supra note 27, at 225. Similarly, William Randolph "would have preferred annual to
biennial, but for the extent of the United States, and the inconvenience which would result
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dential term was also reduced to four years after proposed terms of
life tenure, twenty years, fifteen years, eight years, and seven years
were debated and rejected.3"
Because of these frequent elections, it was virtually inconceivable
that most incumbents would be able to win continual re-election.39
Rather, the common assumption was that frequent elections would
produce a high degree of turnover. This assumption is plainly evident
in the debate over the length of tenure for representatives.
Antifederalist "John DeWitt," for example, argued in favor of a oneyear term for representatives despite his belief that two-thirds of the
members would be new each term. 40 James Madison, likewise assuming that "new members ... would always form a large proportion" of the House, urged longer terms in order to allow the newcomers to learn their job.4 1
The Framers' decision to "stagger" the terms of Senators also
demonstrates the common assumption of significant turnover. 42 Staggered terms were advocated as a mechanism both for ensuring that
not all members would be new at the same time4 3 and for creating
at least a limited degree of accountability in the Senate by compelling
one-third of its members to run biennially. 44 The former rationale as-

from them to the representatives of the extreme parts of the empire." Id at 224.
38. See THE FEDERALIST No. 53, supra note 32, at 358-68.
39. Hamilton observed that, "[a] few of the members [of the House], as happens in all
such assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent re-election, become members
of longstanding . . . ." Id. at 359. He clearly envisioned, -however, that most of the seats
would be continually occupied by new members. Contrasting the continual re-election of the
delegates to the Continental Congress chosen by their state legislatures with the proposed
popularly elected representatives in the House, he argued that "their re-election is considered
by the legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course. The election of the representatives
by the people would not be governed by the same principle." Id. (emphasis added).
40. John DeWitt, No. 3, Fall 1787, in 2 PHILP KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 51 (1987).
41. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 225.
42.

See U.S. CONsT. art. 1I, § 1.

Immediately after [the Senate] shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of
the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second
Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third
Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every
second Year.
Id
43. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 224-25. "In order to prevent the inconvenience of an entire change of the whole number [of House members] at the same moment,
[Mr. Dickinson] suggested rotation, by an annual election of one third." Id
44. In the Massachussets ratification debates, Mr. Ames argued that, although "the
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sumes a relatively high degree of turnover to make it necessary; the
latter depends upon the same assumption for its efficacy.
In addition to adopting relatively short terms of office, the Framers created a second check on the ability of the Congress to insulate
itself from its constituents by explicitly assigning to the states primary authority to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner" of congressional elections, albeit subject to congressional override. 45 The Framers recognized that election procedures could be used to shape and
control the Congress. Indeed, many argued that state regulation was
necessary because otherwise the Congress might set election rules so
as to favor a certain group or class-likely themselves. For example,
Brutus wrote:
The proposed Congress may make the whole state one district, and
direct that the capital (the city of New York, for instance) shall be
the place for holding the election; the consequence would be, that
none but men of the most elevated rank in society would4 6attend,
and they would as certainly choose men of their own class.
On the other hand, ardent Federalists like Madison and Hamilton
believed that the power to regulate elections must be vested at least
in part with the Congress, lest the states manipulate the rules to advance their own parochial interests or to subvert the national government altogether by simply refusing to hold elections.4 7 Defending the
scheme of shared power embodied in Article 1, section 4, Hamilton
wrote,
[E]very government ought to contain in itself the means of its own
preservation .... Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive power of regulating elections for the National Government, in
the hands of the State Legislatures, would leave the existence of the
Union entirely at their mercy. They could at any moment annihilate

senators are seated for six years, they, are admonished of their responsibility to the state
legislatures. If one third new members are introduced, who feel the sentiments of their states,
they will awe that third whose term will be near expiring." 2 ELOT's DEBATES, supra note
27, at 46-47.
45. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4. "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed by each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing Senators." Id
46. Brutus, No. 4, 29 Nov. 1787, in KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 40, at 251.
47. See 5 ELuioT's DEBATES, supra note 27, at 401-02. "The necessity of a general
government supposes that the state legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the
common interest at the expense of their local convenience or prejudices." Id.
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it, by neglecting
to provide for the choice of persons to administer
4
its affairs."
Understanding that power over election procedures was too important to be left to chance, the Framers adopted a compromise, placing primary authority with the states, but empowering the Congress to
override undesirable regulations. This designation was important. It
allows states to shape districts, restrict access to the ballot, determine
a runoff system, and otherwise regulate congressional elections. Nevertheless, the Congress may nullify or replace any regulation it finds
unpalatable.
Thus, when the Framers were ready to finalize Article I, they
had already adopted shorter congressional and presidential terms than
originally proposed on the assumption that these frequent elections
would produce a high amount of turnover. Moreover, they had vested
the primary authority to regulate elections in the states. Given these
measures to prevent a stagnant and unresponsive legislature, the absence of a term limit cannot plausibly be read as strong evidence that
the Framers intended to preclude such a measure. Rather, the best
explanation of the omission is that most of the Framers did not think
a rotation scheme was necessary to guard against perpetual incumbents.
Of course, there were a few anti-federalists and others who objected to a lack of a rotation for the Congress. For example, during
the Virginia ratification debate, George Mason warned that
[n]othing is so essential to the preservation of a republican government as a periodical rotation. Nothing so strongly impels a man to
regard the interest of his constituents as the certainty of returning to
the general mass of the people, from whence he was taken ....

It

is a great defect in the Senate that they are not ineligible at the end
of six years.49

48. THE FEDERALIST No. 59, supra note 32, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton).
49. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 485. Patrick Henry likewise lamented that
"[t]he only semblance of a check is the negative power of not reElecting them. This sir, is
but a feeble barrier, when their personal interest, their ambition and avarice, come to be put
in contrast with the happiness of the people." Id at 167. Samuel Chase of Maryland complained that members of the House "will not be the representatives of the people at large but
really of a few rich men in each state. A representative should be the image of those he
represents. He should know their sentiments and their wants and desires . . . ." 5 TH
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDEALIST 89 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (footnote omitted). Gilbert
Livingston of New York and antifederalist writers "Centinel," "Montezuma," and "John
DeWitt" also decried the lack of rotation and predicted that it would lead to a congressional
aristocracy. See Kenyon, supra note 31, at 62, 89, 390-96.
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Similarly, Thomas Jefferson felt that the absence of rotation, along
with the omission of a bill of rights, was one of the two largest flaws
in the Constitution.5 ° The majority of delegates, however, apparently
believed that the measures that they had already enacted were sufficient."
The majority's assumptions proved correct for quite some time.
In the first House election after George Washington was elected President, forty percent of incumbents were defeated.5 2 Indeed, there was
a tradition that lasted through the first half of the nineteenth century
for members of the House to serve only four years and for Senators
to serve only six. Abraham Lincoln, for example, stepped down after
serving one term in the House and did not run again until he sought
the Presidency.5 3 Perhaps in part due to these traditions, forty to fifty percent of Congress typically left office in every election until the
Civil War.54
Only after the Civil War, in part because the establishment of
standing committees made seniority more important, did House seniority begin to rise. From 1860 to 1920, the average length of service
doubled, rising from four to eight years. By 1991, there were twenty
House members who had held office at least twenty-eight years.55

50. Commenting on the proposed Constitution in a letter to James Madison, Jefferson
wrote, "[another] feature I dislike, and strongly dislike, is the abandonment, in every instance,
of the principle of rotation in office ....

.

2 THE WRmNGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 330

(H.A. Washington ed., 1853).
51. Of course, there were also some Framers who adamantly opposed the principle of
rotation. For example, Alexander Hamilton remarked that, "in contending for rotation, the
gentlemen carry their zeal beyond all reasonable bounds. I am convinced that no government,
founded on this feeble principle, can operate well . . ." 2 ELUOT'S DEBATES, supra note
27, at 320. Speaking against rotation for the presidency, Gouverneur Morris argued that, "[ilt
formed a political school, in which we were always governed by the scholars, and not by the
masters." 5 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 27, at 366-67. He believed that the problem of
representativeness could best be addressed by a popularly elected president, and moved that
each voter should "vote for two persons, one of whom at least should not be of his own
state." Id.
52.

See JOHN H. FUND, TERM LIMITATION: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME, 3 (Cato

Institute, Policy Analysis No. 141, Oct. 30, 1990).
53. This was apparently the result of an informal agreement with his political rivals.
Such agreements were common and evidenced a vigorous party system. See id at 4.
54. See id
55. See TRUDY PEARcE, TERM LIMITATION: THE RETURN TO A CIZEN LEGISLATURE
14 (1991). The record for House service is held by Jamie Whitten (D-MS), who has been a
member for over fifty years. See id Seniority has clearly become more important over time.
In 1811, Henry Clay was chosen Speaker of the House as he began his first term as a
congressman. Of the seven Speakers of the House chosen between 1870 and 1894, one was
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When the 57th Congress convened in 1901, for the first time less
than thirty percent of its members were freshmen. In 1981, when the
97th Congress convened, only seventeen percent of the members were
newly elected. By contrast, when the 101st Congress convened, fewer
than eight percent were newcomers.5 6
Clearly, the Framers' underlying assumptions about the length of
elective service no longer reflect reality. Indeed, the statements of
some anti-federalists warning against a permanent legislature now
appear to have been prophetic. Given the current lack of congressional turnover and the concomitant increase in length of legislative
service, the Framers' apparent reason for not adopting a rotation
scheme-that it was not necessary to ensure turnover-no longer
applies.
Constitutional history, thus, teaches three relevant lessons. First,
the mere absence of a term limit in the Constitution itself hardly can
be said to indicate an intention to preclude such a limit. Second, the
Framers recognized that the power to control the procedures of Congressional elections was significant. For that reason, they divided it
between the states and the Congress. Finally, the Framers' likely
reason for omitting a term limit has been substantially undermined by
subsequent experience.
II.

ARTICLE I OBJECTIONS

While the historical evidence demonstrates that the Framers likely did not intend to preclude a state-imposed term limit, we turn now
to the question of whether the Constitution itself presents any barriers.
In so doing, we first consider Article I, sections 2 through 4, the
provisions that directly govern election to the Congress.
A.

Background

Article I, sections 2 and 3, the "qualifications clauses," establish
three qualifications for membership in the Congress. At the time of
their election, members of the House of Representatives and Senators
must have attained the ages of 25 and 30, respectively; members of
the House and Senate must have been U.S. citizens for at least seven
elected in his third term of office, two in their fourth, two in their fifth, one in his sixth,
and one in his seventh. By contrast, Jim Wright, chosen to be Speaker in 1987, was in his
seventeenth term and Thomas Foley, selected in 1989, was in his thirteenth term. See Fund,
supra note 52, at 4.
56. See FUND, supra note 52, at 4.
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and nine years, respectively; and members of both houses must have
been inhabitants of the state from which they were elected.57 Article
I, section 4, deals with the regulation of congressional election. Specifically, it assigns to the several states the task of regulating the
times, places and manner of congressional elections, albeit subject to
congressional override." Opponents of term limits commonly insist
that a term limit imposes a de facto fourth qualification upon the
Congress-namely, that a candidate not be a long-term incumbent.
The reason is obvious: if labeled a qualification, a term limit would
not likely survive Constitutional scrutiny because, in Powell v.
McCormack,59 the Supreme Court held that at least the Congress
may not supplement the three enumerated qualifications.
Adopting the logic of this argument, however, one could conclude that any election regulation creates a qualification; for example,
a requirement that a candidate gather a given number of signatures
before gaining access to the ballot could be cast as imposing a fourth
qualification that he demonstrate popular support for his candidacy.
Thus, any attempt to determine whether a term limit ought to be
considered a qualification must go beyond mere conclusory labeling
and explain why the label assigned is appropriate.
In this section, we confront directly the assumption that a term
limit constitutes a qualification.' In our view, a term limit is better
considered a regulation affecting the manner of an election. As a
manner regulation, a term limit ought to survive Article I scrutiny
because states have explicit authority to regulate congressional elections pursuant to section 4. Indeed, since Congress may override a
state election regulation at any time, a state could not enact a term

57. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 2 and § 3, cl. 3.
58. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
59. 395 U.S. 486 (1968).
60. We note that another alternative would be to concede that a term limit is a qualification, but to argue that a state may impose additional qualifications pursuant to authority
derived from the Tenth Amendment. See, e.g., JOHN C. SCULLY, CONGRESSIONAL TERM
LIMITATION-IT'S CONSTITUTIONAL FOR THE STATES TO ACT (Washington Legal Foundation)

(on file with the authors). Under this view, Powell would not apply to the states because its
literal holding was no more than that the Congress itself is "without authority to exclude any
person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership
expressly prescribed in the Constitution." Powell, 395 U.S. at 522. Others, however, have
argued that the breadth and exhaustiveness of the Court's analysis in Powell bespeaks an
intention to preclude states from adding qualifications as well. See, e.g., Erik H. Corwin,
Limits on Legislative Terms: Legal and Policy Implications, 28 HARV. 3. ON LEGIS. 569, 58182 (1991). Because we believe that a term limit should be viewed as a manner regulation,
we will not attempt to resolve this dispute.
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limit under section 4 without congressional acquiescence. Put simply,
if we are correct in considering term limits as manner regulations,
Speaker Foley has nothing to complain about save his own ability to
muster a congressional majority to defeat them.
B. Distinguishing Between a Qualification and a Manner Regulation
To resolve the question of whether a term limit is better considered a qualification or a manner regulation, we must first understand
what is meant by each term. Here, the analysis is complicated somewhat because the Supreme Court has never attempted to define either
of the two terms, nor has it had reason explicitly to distinguish between them. Nevertheless, a look at the leading qualification and
manner regulation cases leaves no doubt that the two categories are at
least intuitively distinct; apparently, the Court knows a qualification
or manner regulation when it sees one.
In Powell v. McCormack, the House of Representatives sought to
deny Adam Clayton Powell his seat for alleged unethical behavior 6
even though he had been duly elected and met the age, citizenship,
and residency requirements enumerated in Article I. In an 8-1 decision, the Court held that the House is "without authority to exclude
any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution." 62 An exhaustive survey of parliamentary precedents, the constitutional convention and ratification debates, and past congressional
practice led Chief Justice Warren to conclude that, although the Congress poisesses the power to judge the qualifications of its own members,6' it does not retain the authority to add qualifications lest it
repeat the unfortunate excesses of its past.' Despite the thorough-

61. Powell was accused by a Special Subcommittee on Contracts of the Committee on
House Administration of deceiving House authorities about travel expenses, making illegal
salary payments to his wife, and asserting an unwarranted immunity from the processes of
the New York courts. Powell, 395 U.S. at 489-92.
62. Id at 522. Justice Stewart dissented, arguing that the seating of Powell in a subsequent Congress mooted the controversy. Id at 559-63 (Stewart, I., dissenting).
63. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5. -Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members." Id
64. The Court catalogued the occasions on which Congress has excluded a duly elected
member, characterizing them as "erratic," Powell, 395 U.S. at 545, and noting that the fact
"[t]hat an unconstitutional action has been taken before surely does not render that same
action any less unconstitutional at a later date." Id at 546-47. The Court also noted the
exclusion of John Wilkes, who was expelled from the Parliament in 1763 for publishing
vehement criticism of a peace treaty with France. Wilkes was elected to three subsequent
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ness of the opinion and its unequivocal holding, nowhere did the
Court describe the attributes of a qualification.65
In Storer v. Brown,' the Court considered a California statute
that denied two independent candidates access to the general election
ballot because each had been a member of a major political party
within the preceding year. These congressional hopefuls challenged
the regulation as both an impermissible manner regulation and an
attempt to add a fourth qualification. Writing for the majority in a 63 decision, Justice White dismissed the qualification argument as
"wholly without merit" in a footnote.67 Choosing instead to analyze
and uphold the statute as a manner regulation, he concluded that, "as
a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections
if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather
than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process." 68 Like Chief
Justice Warren before him, Justice White made this choice of framework without explanation.
Although neither Powell nor Storer explicitly discusses the difference between a qualification and a manner regulation, at least six
distinctions may be crafted in an attempt to capture the unspoken line
that separates them. These distinctions are significant because they
facilitate reasoned analysis on the question of whether a term limit
should be considered a qualification or a manner regulation. The first
two-based upon the severity of the restriction and the directness
with which it regulates the congressional office-are sure to be offered by term limit opponents because they suggest that term limits
are qualifications. As we shall see, however, both prove illusory in
light of existing case law. The second pair-distinctions based upon
the timing of the regulation and its generality-are formal distinctions
that only partially delineate the boundary between a qualification and
a manner regulation. Nevertheless, to the extent that these two distinctions have explanatory power, they favor labelling a term limit a

Parliaments and each time they refused to seat him. Id. at 527-29.
65. The Court declined to discuss whether Article 1, section 3, clause 7, which authorizes the disqualification of any person convicted in an impeachment proceeding; Article 1,
section 6, clause 2, which prohibits a person "holding any Office under the United States"
from being a "Member of either House during his Continuance in Office;" and section 3 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which disqualifies any person who has engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the United States, should be considered "qualifications" within the meaning
of Article 1, section 5. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 520.
66. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
67. Id. at 746 n.16.
68. Id at 730.
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manner regulation. The final duo-distinctions based upon judicial
considerations and a measure's invidious potential-prove the most
useful. Although they are not the distinctions upon which courts have
traditionally relied, we argue that they, too, demonstrate that a term
limit should be considered a manner regulation.
1. Severity
Although not explicitly suggested by Powell or Storer, a "qualification" seems intuitively to denote a substantive pre-condition or a
severe bar to the attainment of office.69 By contrast, a "manner"
regulation evokes images of a mere procedural mechanism designed
to ensure that candidates receive a spot on the ballot only after having satisfied certain safeguards. Seizing upon this intuition, commentators have argued that a term limit is a qualification because of the
severity with which it precludes individuals from candidacy or officeholding.1 °
Albeit intuitive, a distinction based upon severity cannot withstand scrutiny. Upon closer inspection, the constitutionally enumerated
qualifications prove not to be particularly difficult to attain. Moreover,
courts have consistently upheld as manner regulations state election
procedures that inarguably pose substantial barriers to office-holding.
Finally, the Hatch Political Activity Act (hereinafter the "Hatch
Act"),7 ' which effectively bars federal employees from running for
the Congress, and political gerrymandering have been treated as permissible manner regulations. Each of these permissible manner regulations poses an obstacle to the attainment of office at least as severe
as the enumerated qualifications and more severe than the term limit
that we defend. Thus, the perceived severity of a term limit presents
no reason to label it a qualification.
The intuition that a qualification is inarguably severe or perma-

69. Representative Jim Kolbe (R-AZ), in a recent op-ed piece, argues that manner
regulations involve only "election procedures," while the qualifications clauses govern the
"substance of office-holding." See Jim Kolbe, Tern Limits Are Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 13, 1992, at A19. Kolbe claims that, because term limits affect the substance of officeholding, they are unconstitutional qualifications. Like many others who distinguish between
substance and procedure, however, Kolbe neglects to explain what he means by those terms.
In the context of Article I, we think that "substance" must be closely aligned with severity
or permanency and "procedure" can only mean less severe or permanent. For simplicity's
sake, then, we eschew the "substance" and "procedure" labels and instead discuss the distinction as one based upon severity.
70. See id.; Corwin, supra note 60.
71. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-27 (1980) [hereinafter the "Hatch Act"].
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nent is belied merely by examining the three enumerated in Article I.
The residence qualification is easily mutable and the age and citizenship requirements are less mutable only by degree; they are not qualitatively different. Accordingly, any attempt to portray a qualification
as self-evidently stringent finds little support in the Constitution itself.72
Moreover, the ballot access cases demonstrate that a state may
severely regulate candidates in their attempts to become office-holders. Consider again the regulations upheld in Storer in comparison
with those struck down in Powell. Adam Clayton Powell was forced
to sit out for one Congress; the subsequent Congress allowed him to
take his seat. Likewise, the two congressional hopefuls in Storer had
to wait two years until the next congressional election to renew their
candidacies. As Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, the California
regulation had the effect of forcing an affiliated candidate to declare
his independent status seventeen months before the general election.73 The Justice found this "an impossible burden to shoulder" in
the context of a two-year congressional term. 74 Despite the
measure's severity, however, even Justice Brennan would have stricken it as violative of First Amendment associational rights, not as
creating a fourth qualification.
Two other examples also undercut the severity distinction. In
American Party of Texas v. White,75 the Court considered a Texas
statute that denied a party access to the ballot in congressional races
unless it had garnered 2% of the vote in the previous general election
or had filed petitions signed by more than 1% of the voters who cast
votes in that election. In upholding the statute as a manner regulation,
the Court found itself "unimpressed with arguments that burdens like
those imposed by Texas are too onerous."7 6 Even if it had found the
support requirements unduly burdensome, the Court would have
stricken them as violative of the First Amendment or of the Equal

72. The three constitutionally enumerated qualifications are best explained as procedural
proxies for characteristics that the Framers hoped that successful candidates would possess.
Wilson Carey Nicholas, a Virginia Federalist, argued that the age, residence, and citizenship
qualifications "create a certainty of [candidates'] judgment being matured, and of being
attached to their state." 3 ELuIoT's DEBATES, supra note 27, at 8. In a rough sense then, age
serves as a proxy for maturity and wisdom; residence bespeaks an attempt to ensure
representativeness; and the citizenship requirement is a stand-in for patriotism or nationalism.
73. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 758 (Brennan, L, dissenting).
74. Id.
75. 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
76. American Party, 415 U.S. at 787.
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Protection Clause, not as an impermissible qualification.7
Likewise, in Williams v. Thcker,78 a three-judge district court
considered a Pennsylvania law precluding candidates who lost in the
primary election for Congress from obtaining a position on the general election ballot. Dismissing as "totally without merit"7 9 the argument that the prohibition constituted a qualification, the court upheld
the law on the ground that "a State has a legitimate interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot.""0
Beyond the ballot-access cases, there are other strong suggestions
that severity is not a reason to label an election procedure a qualification. The Hatch Act, passed by the Congress in 1939, explicitly prohibits most federal government employees from "[b]ecoming a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective public office."8 '
This outright ban, which of course includes campaigns for congressional office, was first upheld by the Supreme Court in United Public
Workers v. Mitchell.82 Despite subsequent lower court decisions
striking down portions of the Hatch Act (apparently on the assumption that Mitchell was outdated), 83 the Court reaffirmed its constitutionality in United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of
4 As in Storer, the Court in Letter Carriers considLetter Carriers.8
ered First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the Hatch Act at
length and concluded that the Hatch Act promoted legitimate state
interests in maintaining an independent civil service. 5 Yet, despite
the absolute nature of the ban on candidacy, neither the parties nor
the Court ever suggested that it constituted a qualification for office.

77. Cf. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (striking down a 5% support
requirement as violative of the First Amendment).
78.

382 F. Supp. 381 (M.D. Pa. 1974).

79. Id at 388.
80. Id.

81. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 556 (1973).

82. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
83. See Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187 (Ist Cir. 1973); Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d
456 (5th Cir. 1971); Gray v. Toledo, 323 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Bagley v.
Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 421 P.2d 409 (Cal. 1966); Minielly v. State, 411 P.2d 69
(Or. 1966).
84. 413 U.S. 548 (1973). The Court also upheld an Oklahoma statute that essentially
imposed the Hatch Act's prohibitions upon Oklahoma state employees. See Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
85. The Court stated the interest in creating an independent bureaucracy: "Government
employees [will] be free from pressure and from express or tacit invitation to vote in a
certain way or perform political chores in order to curry favor with their [political] superiors
rather than to act out their own beliefs." Letter Carriers, 413 U.s. at 566.
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Finally, a look at the Court's treatment of political gerrymandering also undercuts the severity distinction. While a state legislature
may effectively prevent a particular candidate from ever seeking congressional office-or even effectively remove an incumbent-through
redistricting legislation, at no point has the Court considered even the
most contorted political gerrymander a de facto qualification for office; all have been analyzed as manner regulations.8 6
In sum, the enumerated qualifications are less severe than the
manner regulations that the Court has upheld to date. Indeed, permissible manner regulations prohibit minor party candidates, primary
losers, federal employees, and those not favored by state redistricting
from running even in their first congressional election. Thus, the
perceived severity of a term limit that relegates a twelve-year incumbent to run a write-in campaign presents no principled reason to label
it a qualification.
2. Directness
In a second distinction, a few courts have relied upon the directness with which a state election restriction affects the congressional
office to separate a qualification from a manner regulation. In
Signorelli v. Evans, 7 for example, the Second Circuit observed that
a New York statute requiring a state judge to resign from the bench
before running for Congress only indirectly impinged upon the conduct of congressional elections. Contrasting this "resign to run" provision with laws requiring a congressman to reside in the district from
which he was elected, the court upheld the resign-to-run statute because New York had sought to "regulate the ... office that [the state
official] holds, not the Congressional office he seeks." 88
Seizing this distinction, one could argue that a state-imposed
term limit would be unconstitutional because it directly regulates a
congressional election. This argument, however, simply proves toomuch; to argue that an election regulation is unconstitutional by virtue

86. In Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986), the Court declared an enormously
high standard for stating a cognizable equal protection cause of action in political gerrymandering cases: plaintiffs have to prove both intentional discrimination and a pattern of discriminatory impact. Indeed, the Court has acknowledged that states are not expected to draw up
districts without regard to their political effect: "The reality is that districting inevitably has
and is intended to have substantial political consequences." Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735, 753 (1972).
87. 637 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1980).
88. Id. at 859.
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of its directness is flatly inconsistent with the assignment in Article I,
section 4, of primary responsibility for the regulation of congressional
elections to the states. Moreover, the Court's approval of severe and
direct ballot-access restrictions in Storer, American Party, and other
cases also demonstrates that a distinction based upon directness is illconceived. Thus, the directness of a measure cannot cause it to be
labelled a qualification.
3. The Timing of the Restriction
A third possible distinction between a qualification and a manner
regulation is suggested by the fact that the only two Supreme Court
cases analyzing the qualifications clauses-Powell and Bond v.
Floyda9-involved refusals to seat representatives who had already
been duly elected. By contrast, manner regulations invariably precede
the election that they purport to police. Thus, one could argue that
qualifications operate to exclude candidates after an election, while
manner regulations precede it..
This ex pos /ex ante distinction fully explains why the Court in
Powell looked to the qualifications clauses to order the seating of
Powell; because he had already been duly elected, no argument about
impermissible election regulation was possible. Nevertheless, the ex
posVex ante distinction does not demarcate the categories in all circumstances. It is easily conceivable that an ex ante restriction could
be analyzed as a qualification. If the Congress, for example, passed
legislation requiring congressional candidates to be at least forty-years
old before running, there is little doubt that the measure's constitutionality would be judged to be a qualification because of its obvious
parallel to the constitutionally enumerated qualifications and the holding in Powell.'
To the extent that a distinction based upon the timing of a restriction has explanatory power, however, it favors term limitations
like Colorado's that are applied only prospectively.91 Because a pro-

89. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
90. Indeed, district and state courts have summarily stricken state election restrictions as
impermissible additional qualifications when those regulations created unavoidable similarities
to the three constitutionally enumerated qualifications. See Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F. Supp.
609, 613 (D. Neb. 1968) (overturning district residency requirements for representatives
because "[s]tates have no authority to add qualifications to those set forth in Article 1,
Section 2."); State ex rel Chavez v. Evans, 446 P.2d 445 (N.M. 1968); Hellman v. Collier,
141 A.2d 908, 911 (Md. 1958); State v. Crane, 197 P.2d 864 (Wyo. 1948) (concluding that
the state constitution cannot modify the eligibility criteria for the Senate).
91. See supra note 20.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:341

spective term limit would not operate to prohibit existing long-term
incumbents from continuing in office, using this distinction, a term
limit would be labelled a manner regulation.
4. The Generality of the Restriction
One reason why we fear ex post facto legislation-that the measure will target an individual or small group-combined with the
facts of Powell, suggests yet another possible difference between a
qualification and a manner regulation. The argument would be that, as
happened in Powell, a qualification could be used more easily to
preclude a single person whom the legislature disliked. By contrast, a
manner regulation, because of its general application, cannot be tailored as narrowly without significantly greater cleverness.
Although this individual/general distinction may have some descriptive force with regard to Powell, it does not present a particularly
solid basis for distinguishing between the two categories. Clever politicians have used many tools to preclude individuals or an identifiable
type of individual from running or winning. When challenged, these
tools have consistently been reviewed as manner regulations.
For proof, we need look no farther than this year's presidential
primary headlines to witness the difficulty that Pat Buchanan and
David Duke had in gaining a place on many state ballots. Although
specifically designed to exclude non-mainstream, relatively late-coming candidates, party rule, ballot-access restrictions have nonetheless
been consistently evaluated as manner regulations.'
Note again, however, that because the Colorado term limit is not
a mechanism for targeting individuals, to the extent that a distinction
based upon generality of application has power, it favors labelling a
term limit a manner regulation.
5. Judicial Considerations
To this point, the possible distinctions that we have explored
between qualifications and manner regulations have been partially
descriptive at best. From the cases discussed, however, one useful

92. For example, David Duke was denied a spot on the ballot for the Georgia Republican primary largely on the ground that a party has the right to choose its own candidates.
That denial was upheld by the Eleventh Circuit. See Duke Loses Appeal to Win Spot on Ga.
Primary Ticket, UPI, Jan. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Under the
same theory, Patrick Buchanan was denied a spot on the South Dakota primary ballot. See
John Hanchette, ACLU Fights to Get Duke, Buchanan on Primary Ballots, Gannett News
Service, Jan. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File.
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observation does emerge: the Supreme Court has chosen to construe
the qualifications clauses extremely narrowly. The Court has instead
examined the vast majority of election restrictions as manner regulations, regardless of their severity or directness.
This conclusion is best illustrated by contrasting several older
lower court decisions striking down state election laws as impermissible qualifications with more recent Supreme Court decisions analyzing
and upholding similar provisions as manner regulations.9 3 These older decisions, which rejected, for example, a New Mexico requirement
that a party candidate must have been a member of his party for at
least a year prior to the primary election,' simply assumed that the
proper mode of analysis was as a qualification. By contrast, the Supreme Court itself has seriously considered the possibility of a qualifications clauses violation in only two cases, Powell and Bond, and
viewed all other state election restrictions as time, place, and manner
regulations. In so doing, the Court has implicitly overruled some of
these earlier state decisions and cast doubt on the validity of others. 95 Thus, the Court's practice strongly suggests that a state election law will be considered as a manner regulation unless it presents
unavoidable analogies to the three constitutionally enumerated qualifications.
At least to a legal realist, this choice of framework makes good
sense. The qualifications clauses, as construed in Powell, are a blunt
weapon; once a court determines that a restriction creates a qualification, it must invalidate the offending provision. A court has no discre-

93. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Judges, 116 N.W.2d 233 (S.D. 1962) (governor and
lieutenant governor not eligible for other office during term); State ex reL Handley v. Superior Court of Marion County, 151 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. 1958) (governor not eligible for U.S.
Senate); Riley v. Cordell, 194 P.2d 857 (Okla. 1948) (state supreme court justice not eligible
to run for nonjudicial position); State ex reL Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 24 N.W.2d 504 (Wis.
1946) (state judge not eligible for other office); Buckingham v. State ex reL Killoran, 35
A.2d 903 (Del. 1944) (state judges forbidden from running for other positions until six
months after the expiration of their term); State ex reL Sundfor v. Thorson, 6 N.W.2d 89
(N.D. 1942) (candidate defeated in primary not eligible to run for same office in general
election); Stockton v. McFarland, 106 P.2d 328 (Ariz. 1940) (state judge not eligible for
federal office); Chandler v. Howell, 175 P.2d 569 (Wash. 1918) (state judge not eligible for
other office).
94. See Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.M. 1972).
95. Storer at least implicitly overruled the cases cited supra note 93, striking down
provisions requiring a period of party affiliation as imposing a "qualification." Likewise,
Williams v. Tucker, 382 F. Supp. 381 (M.D. Pa. 1974), casts serious doubt on the New
Mexico decision. Finally, Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982), suggests that the cases
cited supra note 93, striking down "resign to run" statutes as qualifications, are also incorrect.
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tion to permit a qualification with salutary characteristics. By contrast,
the Equal Protection and First Amendment inquiries used to evaluate
manner regulations are much better suited for separating unduly discriminatory or chilling legislation from election regulations that advance legitimate state interests.
This distinction suggests that, because a term limit presents a
difficult classification dilemma and its effects upon incumbents and
voters are complex, a court would likely rely upon its more subtle
instrument. Thus, a distinction based upon judicial considerations
demonstrates that a term limit is better considered a manner regulation.
6. Invidious Potential
Finally, one might distinguish between a qualification and a
manner regulation based upon the evils that might follow from their
abuse. In other words, this distinction focuses on the hopes and fears
motivating courts as they choose a constitutional framework for analyzing a term limit. In the drafting and interpretation of Article I, the
Framers and the Court have shared a common hope of fostering fair
and open elections. In the qualifications cases, however, the threat to
that hope was very different from the threat posed by state-imposed
manner regulations.
With respect to qualifications, the Framers and the Court were
preoccupied with preventing the Congress from wielding the power to
control the composition of its own membership, a fear we will label
congressional self-aggrandizement or self-perpetuation. Indeed, so
strong was this fear that the Framers assigned the states primary
authority to regulate the manner of elections.96 By virtue of that assigment, a state-drafted manner regulation cannot present the possibility of congressional self-aggrandizement. Thus, in the manner regulation cases, the Court has been wholly concerned with ferreting out
regulations that impermissibly discriminate or otherwise violate the
right to free expression or association.
Both the Framers' debates and the Court's opinion in Powell
demonstrate that the qualifications clauses were drafted and have been
construed out of a fear of congressional self-aggrandizement. The
present Article I, sections 2, 3, and 5, were adopted only after significant debate. On August 8, 1787, the Convention delegates unanimous-

96. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
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ly adopted qualifications of age, citizenship, and residency.' On August 10, the Convention debated a proposal to give the Congress
"authority to establish such [additional] uniform qualifications of the
members of each House ... as ... shall seem expedient."98 The
delegates rejected this proposal that same day largely out of a fear
that a Congress permitted to set the qualifications of its own members
might permanently ensconce itself in office by limiting new entry. For
example, Hugh Williamson of North Carolina worried that if a majority of the Congress should happen to be "composed of any particular
description of men, of lawyers for example, which is no improbable
supposition, the future elections might be secured to their own
body." 99 Similarly, James Madison reminded the delegates that "the
abuse" Parliament had made of its power to fix qualifications "was a
lesson worthy of our attention. They had made the changes ... subservient to their own views, or to the views of political or Religious
parties. " 1°° Madison concluded, and a majority of delegates apparently agreed, that the authority to set additional qualifications would
vest "an improper and dangerous power in the Legislature. " ' ° ' Rejecting the proposal by a 7 to 4 vote, the Convention instead permitted the House to°2 be only "the Judge of the .. . qualifications of its
''
own members. 1
Likewise, the Court in Powell was worried that a Congress with
the power to augment the trio of constitutionally enumerated qualifications might wield it for self-insulation and aggrandizement rather
than for promotion of the common good. The Court's review of history clearly impresses upon the reader the likelihood of abuse. In fact,
the Court concludes its own brief analysis by recognizing that "[t]o
allow [the power to create additional qualifications] to be exercised
under the guise of judging qualifications, would be to ignore
Madison's warning ... against 'vesting an improper & dangerous

97. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 391.
98. Id& at 377-78, 402. The initial proposal by the Committee of Detail was that the
"Legislature of the United States shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifications
of the members of each House, with regard to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem
expedient." Id. at 377-78. Gouverneur Morris, however, moved to strike "with regard to
property" from the Committee's proposal. His intention was "to leave the Legislature entirely
at large" to fix qualifications. Id. at 404. Both the original proposal and Morris' motion were
rejected by votes of 7-3 and 7-4, respectively. I&a
99. Id at 404.

100. Id
101. Id
102. Id. at 378, 406; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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power in the Legislature."" 0 3
By contrast, when a state regulates the manner of a congressional
election, the potential for legislative self-insulation and aggrandizement is present only indirectly, if at all. A temporary majority in the
Congress would have to solicit support from a majority of state legislatures to enact manner regulations that favored the current incumbents. The difference in constituencies and the sheer number of states
and people involved makes this sort of invidious collusion improbable. As long as the dominant party, interest group, or popular sentiment on important issues continues to vary widely among the states,
any faction in the Congress will encounter extreme difficulty in attempting to insulate itself using state election regulations.
This is not to say, however, that a majority in any given state
will not try to ensure that its representatives reflect its own partisan
biases. Indeed, it would be peculiar if a temporary state majority did
not seek to replicate its views in its congressional representatives.
Self-replication, however, is distinct from self-perpetuation and the
former has, at least historically, proven to be tolerably restrained by
our nation's diversity. Accordingly, the Court has used an equal protection and/or First Amendment analysis to measure the constitutionality of state-imposed manner regulations."' Instead of searching for
legislative self-aggrandizement, the Court has looked to see if the
manner regulations impermissibly classify, discriminate, or impinge
upon rights of expression or association.10 5
103. Powell, 395 U.S. at 547-48. In Powell, Chief Justice Warren noted that "[a] fundamental principle of our representative democracy is, in Hamilton's words, 'that the people
should choose whom they please to govern them.'" Id. at '547. It would be a mistake,
however, to emphasize this statement as the animating rationale of the decision because of its
context. As mentioned, the opinion takes an extensive excursion through history, while
confining its own analysis to a single concluding paragraph. Indeed, it would be fair to say
that Chief Justice Warren let history speak for itself. If letting the people choose whom they
please were the animating principle of Powell, the ballot access cases show that it would
prove too much; restricting independent candidates or requiring candidates to demonstrate
significant support before allowing them a place on the ballot surely, though permissibly,
confines the people's ability to choose. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974);
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
104. In offering this distinction, we do not presume to suggest that state legislation may
never create a qualification. Certainly, were a state to pass a statute purporting to modify the
age, residency, or citizenship requirements for the Congress, a court almost certainly would
strike it down because of its obvious parallel with one of the constitutionally enumerated
qualifications. In such a case, however, the question of whether to label the restriction a
qualification or a manner regulation answers itself. Where the choice of labels is not selfevident, a distinction based upon invidious potential provides a meaningful rationale upon
which to base the choice.
105. The intricacies of this analysis, as well as how a term limit such as the one we
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Storer provides a specific example of the inquiry that courts
pursue when evaluating a manner regulation. As mentioned, the California statute at issue in Storer imposed a "flat disqualification" from
the various primaries upon any candidate who had been affiliated
with a major party at any time within twelve months of the primary
that he wished to enter.1 6 The Court first noted that a decision in
the election law context is "very much a matter of 'consider[ing] the
facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State
claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.""0'7 Then it went on to list a variety of
legitimate state interests that it found were promoted by the statute,
including interests in "maintaining the integrity of the electoral process," "ensuring significant support for each candidate on the ballot,"
103
and "preventing splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism."
Concluding that these state goals easily outweighed any interests that
a particular candidate might have in immediate access to the ballot,
the Court did not hesitate to uphold the regulation.
To the extent that a term limit will be judged a qualification or
manner regulation by its invidious potential, a term limit clearly falls
within the broad category of manner regulations. Even a cursory
glance at the attributes and objectives of a term limit makes clear that
it does not present the possibility of congressional self-perpetuation or
aggrandizement. Indeed, it is intended to counteract such evils.
Proponents have suggested four sorts of interests that they seek
to promote through such congressional term limits:
levelling the playing field in an election process
that provides incumbents with practically insurmountable
advantages;
ensuring that elected representatives truly represent and
are representative of the community that elected them;
preventing corruption in office; and
broadening opportunities for participation in public

propose
106.
107.
108.

is likely to fare under it, will be discussed infra, Section HI.
Storer, 415 U.S. at 733.
Id at 730 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)).
Id. at 731, 735-36.
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service. I°9
A court reviewing a term limit would find no reason to determine
that such a measure vests an "improper and dangerous" power in the
Congress. To the contrary, a term limit would strip long-term members of that body of their privileges. A court would, however, need to
evaluate carefully whether a term limit unduly discriminates against
long-term incumbents or frustrates the expressive and associational
rights of incumbents or voters. Thus, a term limit fits squarely within
the category of manner regulations as defined by invidious potential.
C.

Conclusion

In this section, then, we have seen that whether a term limit
should be considered a qualification or a manner regulation presents a
complex question of labelling and categorization. Rejecting facile
distinctions based upon severity or directness as not sustainable in
light of existing case law, we have instead argued that distinctions
based upon judicial considerations and a regulation's invidious potential present a reasoned basis upon which to affix the manner regulation label to a term limitation.
III.

BEYOND ARTICLE I: FIRST AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT OBJECTIONS

If courts do indeed classify term limits as manner restrictions,
opponents are left facing the following question: what other constitutional objections can be leveled against state-imposed limits on congressional service? The answer is not immediately apparent from the
text of the Constitution because the Framers failed to include any
In fact,
explicit protection of political rights in their document.'
109. The Colorado amendment does not explicitly recite each of these rationales, but
states only that term limits are intended to "broaden the opportunities for public service," and
the need to "assure that members of the United States Congress from Colorado are representative of and responsive to Colorado citizens." COLO. CoNsT. art XVII, § 9(1). while it fails
to mention explicitly the vast advantages that incumbents enjoy and the anti-corruption aspect
of term limits, one might argue that these rationales are implicit within the proposal's demand for representative representatives.
The California initiative, limited only to state legislators, does a more thorough job of
reciting the reasons for term limits, emphasizing that "the Founding Fathers established a
system of representative government based on free, fair, and competitive elections," and that
term limits are necessary to "restore a free and democratic system of fair elections, and to
encourage qualified candidates to seek public office . . . ." CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.5.
110. One might attempt to argue that Article IV, section 4, wherein a "[r]epublican
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the only remaining provisions that offer opponents any serious hope
of thwarting a term limit are the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In this section, we turn to consider the strength of potential free
speech and equal protection arguments. In so doing, the proper conclusion comes quickly into focus: to the extent that the free speech
and equal protection doctrines have been used to fashion political
rights, they do term limit opponents little or no good. Once over the
qualifications hurdle, term limits are, in a real sense, in the home
stretch.
In coming to this conclusion, we take two steps. Because the
level of scrutiny applied in First and Fourteenth Amendment adjudication frequently foreshadows the result on the merits, we first examine
the standard of review that a court will likely employ to assess a
term limit. We then apply it to the rights and interests term limit
opponents might assert.
A.

Standard of Review

It is familiar learning that the standard of review applied by the
Supreme Court in the First Amendment and equal protection contexts
has been in a state of flux.1" Cases involving candidate and voter
rights are no exceptions. They have varied from employing a rather
narrow rationality review to invoking a somewhat stricter form of
scrutiny."' In Anderson v. Celebrezze,"' however, the Court has
recently provided a new and comprehensive framework for analyzing
all election regulation cases.
Anderson involved a challenge to an Ohio election law by both
John Anderson, the 1980 Independent candidate for president, and
voters inclined to vote for him. The law in question required the
candidate to file 5,000 signatures by March 20 in order to appear on
the November ballot. The Court found these regulations too onerous
and, in striking them down, announced a three-step standard of review in election law cases, abondoning the "strict" and "rational"

[f]orm of [g]overnment" is guaranteed, is an explicit protection of political rights. However,
the courts have consistently refused to utilize the Guarantee Clause, claiming that judicial
enforcement is precluded by the political question doctrine. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
111. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3 (4th
ed. 1991).
112. Compare, e.g., Storer, 415 U.S. 724, with McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs,
394 U.S. 802, 807-11 (1969).
113. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
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labels altogether. Lower courts are now expected to
first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to
the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that
the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. [They] must then identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for
the burden imposed by this rule. In passing judgment, [courts] must
not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those
interests, [they] also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights. Only after
weighing all these factors is [a] reviewing court in a position to
decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional." 4
Under Anderson, then, courts are to balance the interests of
candidates and voters against those motivating the state's actions.
Accordingly, in addressing First and Fourteenth Amendment objec,tions to term limits, we will follow the Court's guidance and (1)
assess the character and magnitude of the asserted burdens imposed;
(2) evaluate the interests advanced by the state as justification for the
burdens imposed; and (3) consider whether the burdens are necessary
to achieve the state's interests.
B.

Burdens on Incumbents

Any analysis of the burdens imposed by a term limit must begin
with the following basic question: who is harmed? There are only
two conceivable "classes" of individuals affected by a term limit: incumbents whose jobs are at stake and voters whose choices might be
narrowed. We turn to consider the magnitude of the burdens that each
class might assert, beginning with office-holders.
Before doing so, one point must be recalled. No matter how
severely a term limit might infringe upon an incumbents' First and
Fourteenth amendment rights, Article I, section 4, inarguably authorizes the Congress to overrule any manner regulation. With such an
obvious means of self-protection available to members of Congress, a
court need not be particularly sympathetic to equal protection or free
speech harms claimed by incumbents themselves.
If courts nonetheless choose to entertain objections by incumbents, three separate arguments derived from the First Amendment
and Equal Protection Clause will likely be made. First, term limits
arguably infringe upon a fundamental right to run for office. Second,

114. Id. at 965-66.
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they perhaps create an indefensible classification by distinguishing
between incumbents and challengers. Third, they may impinge upon
the right to speak and associate by limiting one's ability to run for
office. As we shall see, however, each of these arguments will almost
assuredly fail.
In 1968, when the Supreme Court first struck down a ballot
access restriction, it did so because the regulation inappropriately
discriminated against minority party candidates.115 In the wake of
that decision, some commentators rushed to conclude that the Court
was prepared to announce-or already had announced-a fundamental
right to candidacy derived from the Equal Protection Clause.116
These conclusions were not merely wishful thinking; the Warren
Court was, at the time, in the process of deriving several fundamental
rights from the Equal Protection Clause.'17
With the transition from the Warren Court to the Burger Court,
however, came a new reticence about using equal protection analysis
to craft fundamental rights. 1 In 1972, the Court made plain that it
had not recognized a fundamental right to candidacy." 9 Reaffirming
this conclusion recently in Clements v. Fashing,'20 the Court has
limitamade entirely clear that it will not strike down any legislative
12
tion on candidacy under the fundamental rights rubric. '

115. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
116. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Babener, Note, DurationalResidence Requirements for State and
Local Office: A Violation of Equal Protection?, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 996, 1009 (1972);
Edward T. Hand, Note, Durational Residence Requirements for Candidates, 40 U. CHI. L.
REV. 357, 367 (1973).
117. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (guaranteeing a fundamental right
to interstate travel); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (guaranteeing a fundamental right to vote); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (guaranteeing access to the courts as a
fundamental right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Many even hoped that the Court
might extend this fundamental rights analysis in bold new directions to guarantee welfare and
other "necessities." See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
118. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (stating that "the intractable
economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance
programs are not the business of this Court."); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)
(holding that there is no fundamental right to "decent shelter"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that education is not a fundamental right).
119. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972).
120. 457 U.S. 957 (1982). "Far from recognizing candidacy as a 'fundamental right,' we
have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate's access to the ballot 'does not of
itself compel close scrutiny.'" Id. at 963.
121. The Court has even received some support from the academic community for its
refusal to extend fundamental rights analysis to candidacy. See, e.g., Developments in the
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Likewise, a suspect classification argument provides incumbents
little hope for success. In Clements, the Court acknowledged that
regulations discriminating against poor" and minority party' 3
candidates are nearly always impermissible under the Equal Protection
Clause. However, it quickly added that no other groups or classes
identified to date merit such exacting scrutiny by the Court. 4 This
stinginess with suspect classification analysis in the election context is
emblematic of the Court's general movement away from close concern with regulatory groupings under equal protection analysis.'2 It
also suggests that, because a term limit does not discriminate against
poor or minority party candidates, it is free from classification-based
objections. Indeed, a term limit affects a group far removed from the
suspect class paradigm; Congress is, after all, rather heavily dominated by white (93 %),126 male (95%),'27 millionaires (11% of the
House, 26% of the Senate). 2 8 It would, at the least, be ironic were
incumbents to win protection under a constitutional doctrine initially
intended to serve newly freed slaves.
Even so, incumbents have not been dissuaded from pressing
classification-based claims. In Clements, incumbents specifically argued that a provision requiring incumbents to serve their full terms

Law: Elections, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1111, 1135 n.81 (1975); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1098 n.5 (2d ed. 1988) (remarking that "there is something more than
faintly odd, even in a country boasting that anyone can become President, about a society's
describing as a 'fundamental right' an activity bound to be unthinkable for a vast majority of
its members.").
122. Clements, 457 U.S. at 964-65; see also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974).

123. Clements, 457 U.S. at 964-65; see also Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); American Party

of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
124. See Clements, 457 U.S at 965.
125. Suspect and quasi-suspect classification analysis applies to restrictions based on race,
ethnic origin, gender, and illegitimacy. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have rejected
numerous attempts to add additional classes to this list. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v.
Clebume Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that the mentally retarded are not a

suspect class); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that wealth classifications do
not trigger strict scrutiny); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)
(holding that an age qualification does not demand strict review).
126. See Susan B. Glasser, GOP Says Number of Black, Hispanic Seats Should Double
to 68, But 44 More Realistic, ROLL CALL, Apr. 29, 1991.
127. See Matthew Cossolotto, True Democracy Requires Changing Hill Election System,
ROLL CALL, Dec. 2, 1991.
128. See Jeffrey Berman, Filings Reveal 51 Members of House Qualify for Millionaires
Club, ROLL CALL, July 15, 1991; Craig Winneker & Jeffrey Berman, More Than a Quarter
of the Senate Qualifies for Millionaires' Club, RoLL CALL, June 20, 1991.
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before seeking another elective office improperly discriminated against
them as a class-forcing them to sit out an election cycle while others could run. The Court quickly dismissed this argument, labeling
the waiting period created by this "serve your term" provision a "de
minimis burden." 129 The four-year exclusion from the printed ballot
required by our term limit proposal seems hardly more substantial,
given the twelve years that incumbents will be allowed to hold office
and the constant availability of the write-in campaign-something that
incumbents in Clements could not use.
Moreover, states impose regulations at least as severe as the
rotational term limit on classes far less privileged than congressional
incumbents without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Some impose durational residency requirements requiring the newly-arrived to
wait up to seven years before becoming eligible to run for state office. 3 ' Others specify minimum ages for candidacy.13 1 Both types
of requirements have been analyzed without reference to the suspect
classification standard and upheld with relative ease. If states can
force one class of citizens to endure these burdens before making an
initial run for public office, it seems highly improbable that a fouryear exclusion from the printed ballot, applicable only to those who
have already served twelve years, will trigger equal protection concerns.
Moving to the speech-related burdens placed upon incumbents,
we return to Clements. There the Court considered whether either the
"serve your term" provision or one requiring certain elected officials
to resign their offices before seeking another violated the First
Although the regulations precluded many elected
Amendment.
officials from becoming candidates when they wished, a majority of
the Court noted that the rules
in no way restrict appellees' ability to participate in the political
campaigns of third parties. They limit neither political contributions

129. Clements, 457 U.S. at 967.
130. See, e.g., Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. -Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974), aff'd, 420 U.S. 958
(1975) (upholding seven years for state senator); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211
(D.N.H.), aft'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973) (upholding seven years for governor); Walker v. Yucht,
352 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1972) (upholding three years for state legislature).
131. See, e.g., Manson v. Edwards, 482 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1973) (upholding a requirement that city council candidates be twenty-five years of age); Blassman v. Markworth, 359
F. Supp. I (N.D. Ill. 1973) (upholding a'requirement that school board members be eighteen
years of age).
132. Clements, 457 U.S. at 972.
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nor expenditures. They do not preclude appellees from holding an
office in a political party ....

[A]ppellees may distribute campaign
33

literature and may make speeches on behalf of a candidate.

Thus, the Court found that whatever First Amendment rights elected
officials enjoy, an unfettered right to candidacy simply is not included
among them. The Court emphasized just how severely elected
officials' free speech rights might be limited by noting that the provisions before it were "far more limited... than this Court has upheld" in Letter Carriers and Broadrick.' 4 Like civil servants, then,
elected officials may indeed have their speech activities curtailed
rather substantially, even so far as to preclude participation in upcoming elections under certain conditions.
The question of how far states may go in burdening the speech
activities of their elected officials may prove to be an interesting
question. But, whatever the outer bounds, rotational term limits seem
safely within those limits. They are, like the Clements regulations,
less burdensome on speech and associational rights than the Hatch
Act; 135 morever, they permit congressional incumbents to participate
fully in the campaigns of third parties, a factor the Court considered
significant in Clements. In sum, there is little term limit advocates
need fear in any assertion of "candidate rights." Incumbents possess
no fundamental right to candidacy, they are not members of an
impermissible class, and they do not enjoy an unlimited First Amendment right to run.
C. Burdens on Voters
We now turn to consider the nature and extent of the impact
term limits will have on voters. Significantly, unlike candidacy, the
opportunity to vote has been deemed fundamental under the Equal
Protection Clause. 36 What remains unclear, however, is what exactly this fundamental right entails and, thus, whether term limits infringe upon the exercise of that right.
One possible theory of the right simply holds that all votes must
be counted equally. This theory has found expression in a recent
Ninth Circuit decision, Burdick v. Takushi,3 7 and fits well with the

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
I
See "severity" discussion, supra Section II.B.I.
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
927 F.2d 469 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 635 (1991).
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Court's analysis in other important right to vote cases.'38
Under this theory, term limits as we imagine them are completely unobjectionable: all voters are treated alike in their inability to find
the twelve-year incumbent on the ballot. Since there is no fundamental right to vote for a particular individual, nothing is lost by the
imposition of a term limit. In fact, by allowing the write-in candidacy
as we suggest, a state might actually provide voters more than is required by First and Fourteenth Amendment analysis.
Another theory of the right to vote, however, requires not only
equal treatment, but also the opportunity to express one's preference
for a particular candidate. Under this view, Burdick is wrongly decided. But, that said, the breadth of a right to vote for a particular individual under this view is not altogether clear. It could simply be that
every voter must have the opportunity to write-in his chosen
candidate's name at the ballot box. Or, more boldly, a right to vote
for a specific individual could require access to the printed ballot for
all interested candidates.
Proponents of the write-in interpretation have some reason for
optimism. Despite Burdick, two courts have decided that the write-in
option is encompassed within the fundamental right to vote. 3 9
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to consider Burdick this term."4 In the end, whether this vision of the
right to vote or that adopted in Burdick ultimately prevails matters
little to our analysis as, under the provision we propose, long-term
incumbents are free to conduct a write-in campaign.' 4 '
A broader construction of the right to vote, one perhaps requiring

138. Courts have stepped in to protect the right to vote in two situations. The first is
when states impose voter qualification regulations that unduly discriminate against a particular
group's access to the franchise. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S.
621 (1969) (holding that conditioning the right to vote in school board elections on the
ownership of property is impermissible); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (holding that a poll tax violates the Equal Protection Clause). The second is when
the state attempts to dilute the effectiveness of the votes of a particular class. See, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that a bicameral legislature must be apportioned on a population basis). In both situations, the Court's concern has focused on the fact
that the regulation in question allows some voters a greater voice at the polls than others.
139. See Dixon v. Maryland State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir.
1989); Paul v. Indiana Election Bd., 743 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
140. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
141. Our reasons for suggesting the write-in as an important addition to the Colorado
provision have now become clear: not only does it help a term limit look more like a
manner regulation for Article I purposes, but it also allows states to hedge their bets on the
eventual outcome of Burdick.
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open ballot access, might well imperil a term limit. However, there is
almost no chance that such a view of the right will ever be adopted.
Unlike the other theories that we have discussed, no court has pursued this notion and it, like the directhess distinction in Article I
analysis, proves too much. If an absolutely open ballot were constitutionally required, then not only would term limits be prohibited, but
the ballot access, Hatch Act, and "serve your term" cases would all
have to be overruled because they permit substantial restrictions on
the names that may be printed on the ballot. Were a right to vote
construed so broadly, one might even argue that the constitutionallygranted power of the states to govern the manner of congressional
elections under Article I, section 4, would become a nullity.
In sum, a term limit does not trammel the right to vote in either
of its tenable interpretations. The right to vote, however, does suggest
that a write-in provision may be an important addition to any term
limit proposal.
D. The State's Interest
Now we consider the state interests advanced by a term limit,
which, under Anderson, must be balanced against the rights of incumbents and voters. As mentioned above,142 proponents have suggested
four interests they seek to promote through term limits: levelling the
electoral playing field, preventing corruption in office, ensuring that
elected representatives truly represent, and broadening opportunities
for participation in public service.
An examination of the case law reveals that these interests are
rational-even compelling-goals for government to pursue. In Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 14 3 the Supreme Court considered a Michigan statute prohibiting corporations from using general
treasury funds to support candidates for state office, but permitting
them to make such expenditures from segregated funds used solely
for political purposes. In upholding the regulation, the Court emphasized that, while it placed a significant burden on corporate speech,
the statute was an important and legitimate attempt to control "the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form .... Cor-

porate wealth can unfairly influence elections."'"

It was, thus,

142. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
143. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
144. Id. at 660.
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deemed a legitimate state purpose to prevent corruption and the unfair
influence of monied interests in the democratic system-something
term limits are specifically designed to do.
These same anti-corruption and level playing field arguments
were employed by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo 45 to uphold a
$1,000 limit on individual contributions to candidates for federal
office. Not only was the regulation deemed a reasonable attempt to
prevent actual corruption in office, but it was also accepted as a
legitimate weapon to combat even
the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual
financial contributions. In [Letter Carriers] the Court found that the
danger to "fair and effective government" posed by partisan political
conduct on the part of federal employees charged with administering
the law was a sufficiently important concern to justify broad restrictions on the employees' right of partisan political association. Here,
as there, Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of
the appearance of improper influence "is also critical . . . if confi-

dence in the system of representative
Government is not to be erod146
ed to a disastrous extent."
Thus, the Court will allow absolute bans on direct corporate contribution, severe caps on campaign contributions, and a near-total elimination of political activity by civil servants, all to the end of eliminating
corruption-and perhaps even its appearance-in government.
The legitimacy of promoting representativeness in government
has also been recognized by the Court. In upholding the Clements
measure requiring certain elected officials to resign before running for
another office, the Court found that states have a legitimate interest in
preventing state office-holders from neglecting their duties or from
making decisions that might advance their own political ambitions
rather than the pubic good.147 Lower courts faced with the application of such "resign to run" statutes against candidates for federal-not just state-office have come to exactly the same conclusion. 4 Further, we note that a concern for representativeness played
an enormous role in Letter Carriers as well. The only possible way
to ensure representative and responsive civil servants, the Court con-

145. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
146. Id at 27 (citation omitted).

147. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1973).
148.

See, e.g., Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853 (1980).
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cluded, was to limit drastically their associational rights.'4 9
This same concern with representativeness was also an impetus
behind many of the ballot-access regulations. Afraid that late-coming
independent candidates are often prompted "by short-range political
goals, pique, or personal quarrel,"" 5 courts have reasoned that ballot
access regulations excluding such candidates from the ballot help
prevent the15 1 "bleed[ing] off [of] votes" from candidates properly on
the ballot.
The rationality of an attempt to limit the effects of entrenched
incumbency finds support in the federal and in state constitutions. The
Twenty-Second Amendment 52 limiting presidential terms, along
with similar state provisions covering governors, are powerful testimony that the limitation of incumbent terms is indeed sound public
policy.15 3 Interestingly, state constitutional limits on gubernatorial
terms have been challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the
federal Constitution in much the same fashion a congressional term
limit might be. 54 They have, of course, been universally upheld,
with courts acknowledging that states have a significant interest in
eliminating "[tfhe power of incumbent officeholders to develop networks of patronage," and "fears of an entrenched political machine
which could effectively foreclose access to the political process. ,155
Also important, these limits have been acknowledged by courts to
help "stimulate criticism within political parties" and "insure a meaningful, adversary, and competitive election.' ' 156 If such state provisions are inoffensive to the federal Constitution, and their rationales
accepted, there is indeed a strong base of precedent to suggest that
the congressional term limits now proposed would also pass mus-

149. See Letter Carriers,413 U.S. at 565. "[i]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that
they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent." Id.
150.

Storer, 415 U.S. at 735.

151. Id.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.

153. Much emphasis has been placed on the fact that these limitations are expressed in
constitutional amendments rather than legislative enactments. However, for our purposes
here-disceming the significance of the governmental interest in term limits under an Anderson balancing test-this distinction has little relevance.
154. See, e.g., State ex rel Maloney v. McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va.), appeal
dismissed sub nora. Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946 (1976); Maddox v. Fortson, 172
S.E.2d 595 (Ga.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 149 (1970).
155. Maloney, 223 S.E.2d at 611.
156. Id.
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57

ter. 1

E. The Necessity of Imposing Restrictions
The final step in the Anderson test requires an inquiry into the
"necessity" of burdening incumbents' and voters' First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights." 8 It explicitly requires the "weighing [of] all
these factors" to determine whether a challenged provision is constitutional.'59
On one end of the balance, the character and magnitude of the
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights affected by term limits seem
not at all profound. To the extent that a right to candidacy has been
judicially developed, it seems almost exclusively concerned with
guarding against regulations that create invidious classifications, especially those based on wealth and minority party status. A term limit
regulation does not discriminate on either basis or, for that matter, on
any other basis traditionally the subject of heightened scrutiny.
Likewise, term limits have little impact on the right to vote. If
Burdick proves to have been rightly decided, term limits will actually
have no impact, as all voters will be equally unable to vote for a
long-term incumbent. If Burdick proves to have been wrongly decided, and the right to vote does include a right to vote for a particular
person, the analysis changes slightly, but the result does not. Voters
will not encounter an incumbent's name on the printed ballot, and
will instead be required to write in the incumbent's name, taking
extra care with their exercise of the franchise. But there is no indication from existing law that the right to vote includes the right to have
one's favored incumbent printed on the ballot. Thus, even if Burdick
is wrong, the right to vote likely constitutes nothing more than the
right to write and no damage is done by the limit we suggest.
On the other side of the balance, strong governmental interests
are promoted by term limits, in our view-in fact, some of the most
basic and important it may pursue. Maintaining a representative de-

157. At this point, opponents might attempt to argue that the governmental interests
explored in this section might justify federal legislation to limit terms, but cannot be used to
justify state action on what is "purely" a federal matter. As we have discussed above,
however, Article I, section 4, does not permit such a wooden view of federalism in the
election context. Instead, it explicitly recognizes the interest that states have in the election of
members from their own soil by allowing them broad regulatory powers over those elections.
See supra notes 45-47, 58, 96 and accompanying text.
158. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
159. Id
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mocracy and limiting the influence of unfair electoral advantages have
moved legislatures and courts to enact and approve bold measures in
the past that restrict certain individuals at least as severely as a term
limit. In sum, once over the qualifications hurdle, the fight on the
First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds does indeed look promising
for term limit proponents.
IV.

STATE LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITs

Although the debate over the constitutional status of congressional term limits promises to continue without a definitive judicial
resolution for several years, 1' 6 recent developments in the California
courts and basic notions of federalism virtually assure state legislative
limits a positive reception in court. Three states have already passed
limitations on state office-holders; 61 two of these even impose lifetime bans, not mere rotation schemes. 62 Further, all three deny state
legislators even the opportunity to conduct write-in campaigns. On the
state level, however, such variations are not likely to prevent their
judicial affirmance.
The case for term limitations on state office-holders is simpler to
build than the case for their federal counterparts in large part because
the qualifications clauses, by their own terms, apply solely to congressional elections. Consequently, state term limits do not require
that we engage in the vexing task of drawing analytical lines between
various sections of Article I, or to explore the boundaries of Powell
and Storer.
In fact, the only serious constitutional objections opponents can
level against state limits stem from the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We have, however, already considered these arguments in
Section III with reference to federal limits and found that they provide opponents with little ammunition. To the extent that a term limit
impairs recognized free speech and equal protection interests at all, it
does so only minimally. Moreover, the governmental interest motivating the imposition of a limit finds strong precedential support. Any
160. A definitive ruling may be some time in coming, in part because Colorado chose,
and presumably other states adopting federal term limits will choose, to apply their provisions
only prospectively. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9(1).
161. These states are California, Colorado, and Oklahoma. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, §
2(a); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 3(2); OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 17A.
162. These are California and Oklahoma. See supra note 161. Colorado has chosen to
apply a rotational scheme to its state legislature similar to the one it imposes on its federal
representatives.
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further discussion of why and how state limits ought to survive First
and Fourteenth Amendment challenges, thus, might seem cumulative.
Still, there are two additional factors uniquely relevant to limitations
on state office-holders that we have not yet discussed and that are of
such importance that they deserve mention.
First is a recent decision of the California Supreme Court involving what may prove to be the nation's strictest limitation.*63 The
California provision holds state senators to eight years in office and
assembly members to six, contains no write-in provision, and is a
lifetime ban. 1" Despite the severity of these restrictions, the court
found the First and Fourteenth Amendment objections raised to be
completely unavailing under an Anderson analysis:
On balance... the interests of the state in incumbency reform
outweigh any injury to incumbent office holders and those who
would vote for them ....

It is true, as petitioners observe, that

respondents have not offered evidence to support all of the various
premises on which [the initiative] is based. But as the United States
Supreme Court pointed out.., a state need not demonstrate empirically all of the various evils that its regulations seek to combat ....
In sum, it would be anomalous to hold that a statewide
initiative measure aimed at "restor[ing] a free and democratic
system offair elections" and "encourag[ing]qualified candidates to
seek public office" is invalid as an unwarranted infringement of the
rights to vote and to seek public office."

The California experience, thus, bolsters our conclusion that the assertion of the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights pose few problems
for a limitation initiative. It also suggests that, at least on the state
level, limitation provisions need not necessarily include rotational and
write-in devices in order to ensure their constitutionality. Thus, the
Colorado rotational concept for state officers may be copied, but may
not be needed.
The truly ambitious might also argue that the California decision
paves the way to include lifetime bans in, and delete the write-in
provision from, the federal limit we propose. But, we fear this may
fail to appreciate fully the Article I analysis. While the lifetime ban
and the write-in prohibition may pass scrutiny under the First and

163. See Legislature of the State of Cal. v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied,
1992 U.S. Lexis 1555, 60 U.S.L.W. 3615 (March 9, 1992).
164. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(a).
165. Eu, 816 P.2d at 1328-29 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Fourteenth Amendments,"6 a federal limit must also be classified as
a manner regulation. As discussed above, the difference between impermissible qualifications and permissible Article I, section 4, regulations, is more one of degree than one of kind; thus, any procedures
that can be added to a term limit to move it closer to the
paradigmatical section 4 manner regulation and further from the traditional qualifications of sections 2 and 3 should be included in order
to pose courts with the most favorable case first. Still, the California
decision does suggest that states have enormous latitude in crafting
their own internal limitation provisions.
Our confidence in the conclusion that states enjoy substantial
discretion in establishing their own election procedures is reinforced
by the second factor specially relevant to state term limits: the federalism concerns raised when one uses the United States Constitution to
regulate how states organize their own legislatures. The Supreme
Court has itself stated that, "[n]o function is more essential to the
separate and independent existence of the States and their governments than the power to determine within the limits of the Constitution ... the nature of their own machinery for filling local public
offices."' 67 From this general concern with the power of the states
to structure their own governments has grown a body of law evidencing a serious disinclination to alter internal state election requirements. Despite substantial constitutional objections, courts have,
among other things, permitted states to develop highly restrictive
mechanisms for filling state legislative vacancies,1 68 to impose severe durational residency requirements on newcomers,169 and to
mandate minimum ages for running for elective office. 7 ° Likewise,
courts have intervened to protect state interests when the federal govits own ideas of how state governernment has attempted to impose
7
ment should be organized.' '
Though federalism concerns do not trump equal protection or
First Amendment concerns or obviate the need to conduct an Anderson balancing test, they surely must be counted in the balance. Just

166. Again, the necessity of a write-in provision may hinge on the outcome of Burdick.
See supra Section Ill.C.
167. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (citations omitted).
168. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1981).
169. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (holding that the federal government may not
dictate a minimum age to vote in state elections).
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how heavily they weigh becomes evident in the Court's decision in
Oregon v. Mitchell:

[The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
never intended to destroy the State's power to govern themselves ....In interpreting what the Fourteenth Amendment means,
the Equal Protection Clause should not be stretched to nullify the
States' powers over elections which they had before the Constitution
was adopted and which they have retained throughout our history.172

No finer examples of the cautious approach courts have exhibited
towards internal state election regulations can be found than the state
durational residency cases. Courts have upheld election regulations
preventing newcomers from seeking their first elective office for up
to seven years after arrival in state. 73 It would be rather
incongruous if such severe limitations were upheld, but a term limit
affecting only the political opportunities of those who have already
had a chance to serve several years was not.
In sum, the constitutional analysis for state term limits follows
the Anderson analysis laid out in Section III, but does so with two
added factors in the balance, both of which press heavily in the
state's favor. The California experience and the federalism concerns
involved in the state context powerfully suggest that, whatever the
eventual outcome of cases challenging federal term limits, term limits
will have a profound impact on the way in which state governments
are organized and operate.
CONCLUSION
Term limits raise enormous questions about our basic notions of
citizenship and representative democracy. They represent a dramatic
rejection of the nation's present legislative scheme and its dependence
upon seniority, rank, and the professional Congressman. They suggest,
too, a move back toward an ideal long-discarded-that of the citizenlegislator.

172. Id. at 126; see also Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 975 n.4 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). "Indefining the interests in equality protected by the Equal Protection Clause,
one cannot ignore the State's legitimate interest in structuring its own form of government.
The Equal Protection Clause certainly was not intended to require the States to justify every
decision concerning the terms and conditions of state employment according to some federal
standard.- Id.
173. See Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974), aft'd, 420 U.S. 958 (1975).
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Our contribution to the ongoing debate about the wisdom of
imposing term limits is relatively minor. We do not purport to provide any answers to the questions of democratic theory raised. We do
not suggest that one representative ideal is superior to another. We
write only to dispel a myth that has detracted attention from such
central concerns: that the enactment of term limits is futile as courts
will quash them. In our view, a strong argument can indeed be made
that state-imposed term limits are constitutional-that they do not
constitute a blatant "end run around the Constitution."' 74
As we have discussed, the absence of a term limitation provision
in the Constitution itself hardly bespeaks an intention on the part of
the Framers to foreclose their subsequent legislative imposition. Article I doctrine, upon which term limits opponents so heavily rely,
indicates that limits are more likely to be deemed legitimate manner
restrictions than inappropriate qualifications. First Amendment and
equal protection guarantees offer incumbents extremely little hope.
And state legislative limits seem bound for success in our courts.
In the end, we believe that the fate of term limits may not be
decided by the courts as nervous incumbents so hope, but in a fashion far more familiar to those they would displace: through the ballot
box.

174. Kolbe, supra note 69.
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APPENDIX

Turnover Rates In The House
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